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ABSTRACT. Gutanan and Levy have prepared an extravagant critique focused mainly 
on the 1980 Andrews-McKennell article in this journal. The clearly'stated purpose of 
that article was to report a "series of explorations into the affeetive and cognitive com- 
ponents of some of the more widely used measures of perceived we/I-being". Guttman 
and Levy ignore this. They proceed on the mistaken impression that we were (or perhaps 
should have been) embarking upon a definitional exercise to relate the concepts of attitude 
and wellbeing. Yet the reason we did not cite their article on that topic was precisely 
because it did not address in a direct or focused way the topic that concerned us. 
Their critique consists of an entirely irrelevant reanalysis of some attitudinal data by 
Ostrom, together with a tissue of recondite def'mitional and methodological issues of little 
consequence either for the objectives or the conclusions of out research. Their dismissal 
of our work as 'scientific retrogression' rests on an a priori definition of science that fits 
their own methodological style but excludes that of many other prominent researchers. 
Their comments reflect an attempt at methodological imperialism. We defend our in- 
dependence - and that of other investigators - to use promising new methodologies 
other than the particular approach advocated by Guttman and Levy. (Their denunciation 
of the new methods of structural equation modeling is not shared even by the authoritative 
reviewer they themselves quote.) In addition to Guttman and Levy's specific criticisms, 
our Response addresses general methodological issues such as the status of structural 
modeling and the testing of structural models. In a concluding section we identify areas 
that merit further research. 
The Gu t tman-Levy  paper 'On the Definition and Varieties of Attitudes and 
Wellbeing' (1981) is largely devoted to a many-sided critique in extravagant 
terms of a previous article by us in this journal (Andrews and McKennell, 
1980), with some additional mention of another article (McKennell and 
Andrews, 1980). (A third article not  mentioned by Guttman and Levy is part 
of  this serieg - McKennell, 1978.) Although we have high regard for much of 
Gut tman and Levy's research, we believe this particular article fa/.ls far short 
of  their usual high standards. Did we not  feel compelled to respond to its un- 
reasonable comments about our own work, we would give it scant attention. 
We believe the criticisms Guttman and Levy make about our work reflect a 
misunderstanding about our purpose - though our article was not  ambiguous 
about this - and an idiosyncratic view about what constitutes useful ways to 
proceed in social science that is not  shared by recent authoritative reviewers 
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or ourselves. Guttman and Levy's comments reflect an attempt at method- 
ological imperialism that we fred surprising, and we defend our indepen- 
dence - and that of other investigators - to use promising new methodologies 
other than the particular approach advocated by Guttman and Levy. 
This Response is divided into three main sections. First, we comment on 
some of the criticisms made by Guttman and Levy that are specific to our 
article; these matters do not lead far but need to be addressed early. Then we 
turn to several wider-ranging topics dealing with structural m o d e l i n g -  
issues of long range and general importance. And, third, we briefly consider 
a couple of future research activities suggested by the preceding discussions. 
I .  R E S P O N S E S  TO S O M E  C R I T I C I S M S  S P E C I F I C  TO O U R  A R T I C L E  
A. Non-citation of  the 19 75 Levy-Guttman Article 
One of the most repeated charges in the Guttman-Levy article is that we did 
not cite the article by Levy and Guttman 'On the Multivariate Structure of 
Wellbeing' that appeared in this journal in 1975. This criticism appears in 
various forms at least five times! 
The reason we did not cite their article - which we do believe to be an 
interesting and scholarly contribution - i s  simply that it has little relevance 
to what we were investigating. The purpose of our article was clearly stated in 
its Introduction: to report "a series of explorations into the affective and 
cognitive components of some of the more widely used measures of perceived 
well-being" (p. 127). The Levy-Guttman article was not primarily addressed 
to this topic; it presented no detailed hypotheses with regard to this matter; 
its discussion of  findings devoted just one sentence to this topic - and noted 
that their results did not distinguish between affect and cognition. (This 
did not surprise us, because we believe the data Levy and Guttman analyzed 
were not particularly well-suited for finding such differences- though the 
data were good for other purposes - and because the facet/Smallest-Space- 
Analysis methodology Levy and Guttman used is not designed to apportion 
variances of  observed measures into components reflecting distinct sources 
of influence.) 
In short, the Levy-Guttman article simply did not address in a direct 
and focused way the topic that concerned us. 
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B. The Purpose of  Our Article 
Despite the clear statement about the purpose of  our article (quoted above), 
Guttman and Levy seem to be under the mistaken impression that we were 
(or perhaps should have been) embarked on a definitional exercise to relate 
the concepts of attitude and well.being. In fact, whether perceptions of well- 
being might be 'attitudes' was not an issue for us. (For years, we had been 
doing 'attitude surveys' to measure perceptions of well-being!) However, lest 
there were any doubt about our stance, we did quote a Fishbein-Ajzen 
(1975) def'mition of 'attitude' and then said: "It seems obvious that people's 
responses to questions about perceived well-being ...meet the above defmi- 
tions and hence that knowledge about the nature of  attitudes may ...contribute 
to our understanding of self-reports of well-being" (p. 130, emphasis added). 
Actually, our starting point was the considerations and some empirical 
results relating to the role of cognition and affect in the perception of well- 
being set out in an earlier article in this journal by McKennell (1978). The 
brief section rifled 'Connections to Some Previous Research on the Nature 
of Attitudes' in the Andrews-McKennell article was an incidental part of  
what we were about and served simply to point out that the concepts 'affect' 
and 'cognition' have a long history and figure prominently in attitude research. 
It is ironic to observe that had Guttman and Levy attended to the purpose 
we stated for our article, they apparently would have evaluated it differently. 
Referring to our article, their penultimate sentence says: "Were this a part of 
a process o/exploration in order to arrive at actual testable hypotheses, then 
it might have some scientific value" (emphasis added). As quoted above, the 
stated purpose of our article was to report a 'series of explorations'! 
C. Critiques o f  Our Analysis and Interpretation 
Guttman and Levy express distaste for a component-oriented analysis, includ- 
ing the structural modeling approach we used, and we present our comments 
on this matter later. In addition, however, their article includes a generous 
sprinkling of specific criticisms about the analyses and interpretations in our 
report, and some of these deserve attention here. Particularly noteworthy are 
criticisms by Guttman and Levy that simply disregard clear reports of how we 
proceeded or what we found. 
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Expectations about the global well-beingmeasures. Guttman and Levy observe 
(correctly) that we presented some expectations regarding the relative im- 
pacts of affective and cognitive components on the measures of perceived 
well-being that we were analyzing; Guttman and Levy then go on to say (in- 
correctly) that our classification of the measures influenced the modeling 
results reported in our Exhibits 3 and 4. Furthermore, in a surprising lapse 
of good scholarship, they add their own (incorrect) words to a passage they 
quote from page 140 of our article, and then suggest that we said the initial 
classification would affect the results! Actually, anyone reasonably familiar 
with structural modeling could see from the model presented in our Exhibit 
2 that the global well-being measures shown there were free to be assigned 
whatever balance of affects and cognition that would best fit the data. (If 
there were any doubt about this, one could examine the results in our Ex- 
hibits 3 and 4 and see that these results did not agree perfectly with the initial 
expectations. The fact that the results came close to those theoretical ex- 
pectations, however, was one of the fundamental and innovative contributions 
of the paper). Guttman and Levy are incorrect when they write: "Revision 
of their classifications of the items will also change their empirical results". 
Robustness o f  conclusions. Guttman and Levy rail at us for having questioned 
the degree of overlap that might exist between the affect and cognition factors. 
They seem not to have noticed that our article explicitly said: "the degree of 
presumed overlap between affect and cognition actually has little effect on 
the general conclusions that will be drawn about the nature of  self-reports of  
well-being" (p. 131), and (contrary to what Guttman and Levy say) we did 
present the logical evidence for this - in Section 5.3 of our article. 
Our article reported results computed under the assumption that all factors 
were statistically independent of one another. Now, spurred by the expression 
of doubt in the Guttman-Levy article about the robustness of our conclusions, 
we have actually run a model for the American data using an alternative assump- 
tion that Cognition related +0.5 to Positive affect and -0.5 to Negative 
affect. As expected on the basis of the logical evidence presented in our article, 
this new run ranks the well-being measures in nearly the same order as did the 
original results in our Exhibit 3: The correlation (rho) between the order of 
the measures when ranked according to their sensitivity to Positive affect (a) 
under the assumption of substantial relationships between affect and cogni- 
tion (i.e., the results from this new run) and (b) under the alternative assump- 
R E S P O N S E  TO G U T T M A N  A N D  L E V Y  179 
tion of independence of affect and cognition (i.e., the results reported in Ex- 
hibit 3 of our article) is 0.93; the comparable rhos are 0.90 for Negative af- 
fect and 1.00 for Cognition. Furthermore, changing the assumption about the 
relationships between the factors has no e f fec t  at  all on the estimates of com- 
mon methods variance and unique variance that we presented. Guttman and 
Levy are simply wrong in suggesting that changing the assumptions of a 
model will always change one's conclusions. 
Section 5.3 of our article also described a second series of explorations 
designed to see what impact changing assumptions about the relationship 
between two other factors (Positive affect and Negative affect) would have 
on the conclusions, and it reported that here also the f'mdings were highly 
robust. 
Checking the robustness of conclusions under different sets of modeling 
assumptions has been called 'sensitivity analysis' ('Land and Felson, 1978) and 
has been widely applied in our work. We are amazed that Guttman and Levy 
simply disregard the evidence we presented about the robustness of our con- 
clusions. 
Maximum-likelihood estimation. Guttman and Levy claim our use of maxi- 
mum-likelihood methods was inappropriate, though the reasoning behind 
their claim in unclear and we believe it to be unfounded. Furthermore, Gutt- 
man and Levy mislead their readers when they report that we 'justified' our 
choice of the method we used on the basis of its producing maximum-likeli- 
hood estimates. The parameter estimates on which our results were based 
were produced by the Joreskog-Sorbom LISREL program, which is an analyt- 
ically powerful and highly regarded technique that was readily available to 
us. (Guttman and Levy themselves note that this program is 'popular'.) 
LISREL does produce maximum-likelihood estimates, and we noted that in 
our article, but this characteristic was of little importance in our choosing 
LISREL. What was important was that the parameter estimates produced 
by LISREL be appropriate and useful. We have no reason to suspect the 
estimates we obtained are incorrect; Guttman and Levy present no such 
evidence; and current statistical literature f'mds such estimates to be good. 
Lee and Jennrich (1979), for example, in a study of algorithms for eovariance 
structure analysis with latent variables (which is the type of analysis we were 
conducting) found that maximum-likelihood estimates from the modified 
Fleteher-Powell algorithm (which is the algorithm incorporated in LISREL 
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and that we used) "converged nicely to the same weighted least squares and 
maximum likelihood estimates that were obtained from other algorithms" 
(p. 111). Another recent study (Raj, 1980) found that maximum-likelihood 
estimates for simultaneous equations with either normal or nonnormal dis- 
turbances (which covers the kind of analysis we were doing) agreed with the 
estimates obtained from the alternative approaches of least squares, two-stage 
least squares and three-stage least squares. In short, there is good reason to 
believe that our use of a maximum-likelihood technique to produce para- 
meter estimates has led to correct results. 
Now it is the case that doubts exist about the appropriateness of the 
standard errors of these maximum-likelihood parameter estimates (Lee and 
Jennrich, 1979), and - as we noted in our article - the usefulness of the chi- 
square-based probability tests of model fit has also been questioned. It is 
important to note, however, (and Guttman and Levy seem to have overlooked 
it) that neither of these types of statistics are used in our analysis. 
A peculiarity of the Guttman-Levy discussion of maximum-likelihood 
methods is that it seems to have been stimulated by a false impression that we 
confused sampling errors with 'observation' (i.e., measurement) errors. That 
this was not the case should have been obvious from our reporting actual 
estimates of the influence of correlated and random measurement errors. 
(The ability to explicitly take account of, and generate estimates of, various 
kinds of observation errors is one of the important advantages of  the new 
structural modeling technology we used, and is one of the ways our results 
go beyond most of what has been available in the literature previously.) When 
Guttman and Levy miss this aspect of our results, we wonder whether they 
have an adequate understanding of  what we did or of the methodology we 
employed. 
Components and varieties. Guttman and Levy suggest we confounded the 
terminology of 'components' and `varieties'. On the contrary, we were clear 
and consistent in our usage, and we intentionally talked about 'components'. 
The notion of "varieties' does not appear in our article. 
Components o f  components. Guttman and Levy claim we were in effect 
talking about 'components of components'. Neither the phrase nor the idea 
occurred in our article. 
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D. The Discussion of  Ostrom's Work 
A lengthy section of the Guttman-Levy critique is given over to a reanalysis 
of  some data by Ostrom. The only clue Guttman and Levy give as to why 
they consider this reanalysis to be relevant to our work is their claim that we 
'leaned heavily' on Ostrom. But this is incorrect. We devoted little more than 
a paragraph to Ostrom's work and said that we cited it simply as an example 
of the attitude component trilogy that has been investigated by social psychol- 
ogists for the past several decades. We did not ourselves analyze Ostrom's 
data or refer to it in any detail. Almost any author who has written about the 
classical trilogy of components (McGuire, 1969, p. 155, lists nine) would 
have sufficed as an alternative example. Guttman and Levy's lengthy discussion 
of Ostrom's work is an irrelevant diversion as far as the critique of our article 
is concerned. 
We will not burden this Response with further rebuttals to the captious 
comments made by Guttman and Levy. Cries of you-didn't-cite-our-article, 
generalizations that are not dependably true, erroneous quotations, and dis- 
regard for investigators' stated purposes, methods, and results are not the stuff 
of which productive science is made. 
2. S O M E  B A S I C  M E T H O D O L O G I C A L  I S S U E S  OF  G E N E R A L  
I M P O R T A N C E  
A. On Structural Modeling with Latent Variables 
Among the criticisms of our work by Guttman and Levy, the most sweeping 
is their attempt to discredit our entire methodology of data analysis- the 
new technology of structural modeling with latent variables. (Guttman and 
Levy refer to it as a "peculiar bootstrap-type of estimation"!)That methods 
of this complexity should be subject to some criticism is not surprising, 
especially when they are still in the process of development. Guttman and 
Levy, however, denounce the development as a whole. Moreover, they go 
out of their way, quite wrongly, to persuade the reader that their views are 
widely shared by other authorities. According to them, Bentler's recent re- 
view 0980) of this type of analysis "gives a most disheartening assessment of 
the contribution to science made by these approaches". In language similar 
to that in which they dismiss our own work as "a good example of scientific 
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retrogression", and presumably for the same reason, they add: "The multi- 
variate component approach seems to be one of those that have a bright 
future behind them". 
Well, however much Guttman and Levy might believe this, and for what- 
ever reasons they may wish it so, it is simply not the case. This is not the 
place for detailing the contribution the new methods have already made and 
stand to make to psychology and sociology, but we are confident that any 
open-minded reader of Bentler's review will fred it optimistic, not dishearten- 
ing. The best authority here is Bentler himself. What he actually said about 
the new developments is that he believes they hold "the greatest promise 
for furthering psychological science" (p. 420). That Guttman and Levy could 
overlook this and arrive at the opposite conclusion from the same material is 
astonishing. 
B. On Testing Structural Models 
The statements in the Guttman-Levy article about the untestability of  struc- 
tural models need attention because they seem to us to be clearly wrong, and 
to indicate misunderstanding. As indicated above, we are in agreement with 
Guttman and Levy that the formal tests of  model fit presently available from 
the LISREL computer program are of limited usefulness. However, it does 
not follow that models cannot be rejected on other grounds, and we indicated 
the specific kinds of evidence to be considered in Section 4.3 of the Andrews- 
McKennell article. (Our brief treatment there was intended to be suitable for 
the general readership of this journal; readers who want more detailed discus- 
sions may wish to consult Bentler and Bonett, 1980; Fornell and Larcker, 
1981; and/or Maruyama and McGarvey, 1980). 
Guttman and Levy may have been mislead because, in the interests of 
brevity, the Andrews-McKennell article did not describe the extended ex- 
plorations that led to the model used to develop the estimates of  affective, 
cognitive and other components of  the well-being measures. The article 
did, however, report the evidence showing that the model fitted the data well, 
and the McKennell-Andrews article presents much of the developmental 
sequence that suggested we should reject the simpler 'life-as-a-whole' models 
and adopt the 'affect-and-cognition' model. 
The role of formal hypothesis testing in social research (and here we regard 
formal significance tests ofamodel 's fit as a special case of hypothesis testing) 
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has been a subject of considerable discussion. (A useful summary appears in 
Morrison and Henkel, 1970). It is widely agreed that one can reject as 'false' 
those hypotheses that do not fit the data, but that one can never be sure 
that a hypothesis that does fit the data is the 'true' explanation. This is 
elementary philosphy of science, and it applies to 'model testing' as much 
as to any other form of hypothesis testing in science. The Andrews-McKennell 
article recognized this point - that one can never expect to prove, in an ulti- 
mate sense, that a model is correct - and it then went on to observe that the 
model being used seemed reasonable in that it fitted the data well, was in 
accord with extant theory, and gave reasonable parameter values in the light 
of  other knowledge about the limits within which those values should fall. 
We believe that Guttman and Levy are incorrect when they suggest that the 
'testing' of structural models is logically a weaker enterprise than 'testing' 
other formulations of  hypotheses. In all of  empirical science, the quest is 
to account for observed regularities with a parsimonious set of concepts that 
fit together reasonably in the light of  available theory and give useful and 
consistent results. Structural modeling is simply one attractive way among 
many for trying to achieve this. 
3. S O M E  F U T U R E  R E S E A R C H  A C T I V I T I E S  
Preparing this Response has stimulated us to consider a number of research 
activities that seem relevant to topics addressed above and/or in the Gut tman-  
Levy paper. We briefly record these ideas here as items for a future research 
agenda. 
A. The Meaning of the Cognitive Factor 
One of  the aspects of the work reported in the Andrews-McKennell paper 
that concerns us (as we acknowledged in the original article) is the fact that in 
neither of the data sets analyzed them, nor in any other data set, were we 
able to identify a reasonably 'pure' indicator of the cognitive component of  
well.being. As was explicit in the analyses we reported, the cognitive factor 
was defined residually: It was what the global well-being measures had in 
common after taking account of  Positive affect, Negative affect, and cor- 
related measurement error. In view of extensive discussions about attitudes 
incorporating affective and cognitive components, it seemed reasonable to 
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call this residual factor "cognition'. This also fit in nicely with the idea that 
self-reports of well-being might reflect two kinds of reactions: 'emotional' 
(i.e., affective) responses, and 'rational' (i.e., cognitive) evaluations against 
one or more criteria. (These ideas are more fully discussed in McKennell, 
1978, McKennell and Andrews, 1980, and in Andrews, 1981.) Furthermore, 
this view of cognition as involving a judgement of how the self stands 
with respect to one or more criteria provides a theoretically appealing 
linkage between two recent sets of findings: (a) the findings reported in the 
Andrews-McKennell article that satisfaction measures tended to be more 
'cognitively' oriented than happiness measures, and (b) the findings reported 
by Michalos (1980) that satisfaction measures reflected a 'gap' between 
achievements (i.e., the nature of oneself or one's life) and aspirations (i.e., 
the criteria). 
Some of the comments by Guttman and Levy about our being 'confused' 
with respect to the cognitive character of the satisfaction measures may stem 
from their not recognizing the residual character of  the cognitive factor in 
our analyses. How the cognitive factor in satisfaction measures relates to pre- 
vious treatments of  'cognition' in attitude research would be worth further 
theoretical analyses and empirical investigation. (In a current project we are 
experimenting with some new items intended to provide purer and more 
direct measurements of  the cognitive factor that we obtained only by resid- 
ualization in our previous work; results from this new undertaking will be 
reported as they become available.) " 
B. Measures of  Fit for Structural Models 
A previous section of  this Response mentions the kinds of  evidence that 
would lead one to reject a structural model, and Guttman and Levy also raise 
this issue. While we are much more sanguine than they about the rejectability 
of inappropriate models, we do believe that further methodological work in 
this area would be helpful. Users of structural modeling algorithms would 
benefit from measures of  model fit that are more sensitive than calculations 
of  mean (absolute) covariance residuals and that are free from the strict 
probability/statistical-test orientation of the presently available chi-square 
indicators. Work recently reported by Bentler and Bonett (1980) and by 
Fornell and Larcker (1981) addresses this general need but - in our view - 
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has not  yet arrived at a fully satisfactory solution. Hopefully, further develop- 
ments will be forthcoming. 
University of Michigan 
University of Southampton 
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